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Since the end of the Cold War, election monitoring activities have become more 
common around the world, particularly in Africa as democracies flourish. Former 
authoritarian regimes everywhere have come under international pressure and pressure 
from within (their own populations) to give way to freely elected governments. This 
thesis will investigate one avenue of support for transitional democracies that comes from 
the United States (U.S.) In the form of election monitoring and technical assistance. This 
research is significant because it will substantiate the claims made by scholars in the field, 
like McCoy,1 of a shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa after the Cold War. 
The shift in policy was evident in the early 1990s. Many African countries in 
transition, from single-party states to emerging democracies asked for two kinds of 
immediate short-term help from the United States Government (USG). The first kind of 
help requested was technical assistance in organizing elections based upon democratic 
principles, and second, international observers to attest to the freeness and fairness of 
elections. These requests led the United States Agency for International Development 
'Jennifer L. McCoy, “Election-Monitoring and National Sovereignty,” Paper presented to The 
Council of Foreign Relations Project on sovereignty and New World Politics, Washington, D.C., 12 
January 1995: 10:13. 
1 
2 
(USAID) to set up the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF) as a rapid 
response, easily accessed, low USAID management intensity mechanism to support local 
and national elections in sub-Saharan African countries which were committed to free 
and fair elections.2 The AREAF provided: 
... targeted focused assistance to governments and NGOs that included: electoral 
assessments, election monitoring, organizing and implementing elections, civic 
education and training, and organizational support for election commissions and 
indigenous Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs).3 
The onslaught of former authoritarian countries embracing democracy created a new and 
specialized field of work for private volunteer organizations and governments, thus 
giving birth to a new growth industry, the election observation industry. 
Statement of the Problem 
The African-American Institute (AAI) was awarded the USAID contract to 
administer the AREAF in cooperation with the National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute for International 
Affairs (IRI), with collaboration from The Carter Center at Emory University (CCEU). 
AREAF was granted $16 million to undertake a four-year project with a view to 
providing technical assistance and assistance for monitoring elections in sub-Saharan 
African countries undergoing transition. The AREAF financed eighty-three programs in 
thirty-five sub-Saharan African countries and funded the monitoring of a total of thirty- 
2Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund: A Final Report on Democracy Development 
Programs. Cooperative Agreement No. AOT-0486-A-2134-00. Submitted by: African American 
Institute, International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 20 
September 1986: 237. 
3Ibid. 
3 
one elections. Of the thirty-one countries that held elections, three received a substantial 
portion of the AREAF total funding and technical help. These were Kenya, Uganda, and 
Côte dTvoire. The researcher has therefore chosen to look at these three countries, one 
from each region (east, west and central) of sub-Saharan Africa. This study investigates 
the principal factors that influenced administrators of the AREAF to focus on these three 
countries. Did the type of democratic transitional approach instituted by each of these 
countries have an impact on AREAF funding activities? This question is the main thrust 
of this paper. 
Organization of the Study 
The first chapter deals with the introduction, statement of the problem and the 
organization of the study. The second chapter presents an overview of democracy and 
democratic transition, as well as democratic transition in Africa, and it also includes a 
discussion of foreign aid and technical assistance. The third chapter discusses the 
methodology, and data collection and analysis. 
Chapters four through six summarize the recent political history of Kenya, 
Uganda, and Côte dTvoire and these countries’ attempts at democratic transition followed 
by a review of how the AREAF was instrumental in providing assistance to each country. 




Because elections are the first step in the attainment of a democratic government, 
any discussion of elections must begin with the definition of democracy. The classical 
theory of democracy, rooted in eighteenth century philosophy, defined democracy as: 
... the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes 
the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election 
of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.1 
In his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter preferred an 
alternative and in his view a more precise definition. Schumpeter found this “classical’' 
definition to be extemely vague and redefined the term as an “institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”2 Although Schumpeter’s definition 
is widely accepted by social scientists, some have chosen to adopt variations of it. Lipset, 
Diamond and Huntington emphasized electoral systems for political competition for 
votes. Lenski, Dahl, Bollen and Liu emphasized political equality as an example of what 





a modem political system as a whole should include.3 
Lipset, for example, focused more on competitiveness. In a text titled Political 
Man, Lipset defined democracy as a political system which supplies regular constitutional 
opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits 
the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing 
among contenders for political offices.4 
Larry Diamond, on the other hand, defined democracy as a system of 
institutionalized competition for power.5 Huntington, also agreeing with the 
competitiveness definition, stated that the existence of civil freedoms such as speaking, 
publishing, assembling, and organizing are also necessary to political debate and the 
conduct of electoral campaigns. These civil freedoms, said Huntington, are in fact 
implied in this definition.6 The competitiveness model of democracy carries enormous 
support in the West, for it is widely accepted by individuals at all levels of society when 
determining if a system of government is democratic or non-democratic. This model is 
slowly catching on in other parts of the world. 
Scholars such as Lenski approach the definition of democracy a little differently. 
Although not disagreeing with the competitiveness model, Lenski defined democracy 
3Yong-chuan Lui, Patterns and Results of the Third Wave (New York: University Press of 
American, Inc., 1992), 9-10. 
4S.M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday & Company. 1963), 27. 
’Larry Diamond, “Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization,” 
TheWashinton Quarterly (Winter 1989): 142-143. 
6S. Huntington, T'neThird Wave: Democratization in The Late Twentieth Century’ (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7. 
6 
"not only by the extent of the electoral franchise but also by the existence of political 
liberties, which preserve the right of organized political opposition.”7 Still others prefer 
not to use the words “political freedom” and “political equality,” using instead such 
words as “responsibility,” “accountability”, or “elite-mass relation.” Dahl, for example, 
considered democracy to be a regime which ensures the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, who are considered politically equal,8 while 
Bollen defined democracy as a regime in which the political power of the elite is 
minimized and that of the non-elite is maximized.9 In contrast, Liu summarized 
democracy as citizenship, meaning that all citizens have the right to be treated by fellow 
human beings as equals when making collective choices, and that those implementing 
such choices have an obligation to be equally accountable and accessible to all citizens.10 
The concept of democracy covers far more than just the competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote and a government’s responsiveness to its citizens. African scholars like 
Paul Ntungwe Ndue, Professor at the University of Yaunde II in Cameroon, cited that for 
Africa, democracy means majority rule and the representative institutions that go hand-in- 
hand with it." According to Ndue, several things are needed in any African country to 
7Liu, 10 
8Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1971), 2. 
9K.A. Bollen, “Issues in the Comparative Measurements of Political Democracy,” American 
Sociological Review 45 (1980), 378. 
l0Liu, 10. 
"Paul Ntgungwe Ndue, “Africa Turn Toward Pluralism,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 
(January 1994): 47. 
7 
ensure democracy. The first of these is the existence of a democratic state. The 
attributes of a democratic state are multiparty representation, freedom of the press and 
information, independent judiciary, free and fair elections and peaceful transfer of 
power.12 The state must also guarantee separation of religion and state, as well as the 
separation of the state from political parties.lj 
The second attribute essential to democracy in Africa is a free and vibrant civil 
society. According to Ntungwe Ndue, no democratic state can survive for long without 
the foundation provided by a democratic society. The development of a democracy is not 
acquired overnight and may be eroded or even destroyed, if individuals are not vigilant in 
upholding the ideal of democracy. In Africa, as in any other region, safeguarding human 
rights, struggling against tribalism and the promotion of cultural pluralism in addition to 
the institutionalization of political power are key. In this context: 
. . . institutionalization of political power means ensuring that leaders conform to 
regular and pre-established laws, with no provision for change to suit their 
personal whims of dynastic ambitions. They are thus compelled to recognize that 
they are only the representatives of the nation, and that sovereignty is not 
something that belongs to them.14 
The third is the existence of several other surrounding democratic regimes.15 
Because these regimes are fragile, it is often difficult for them to survive in a hostile 






strengthen emerging democracies by rescuing them from isolationism. “Political 
pluralism may be consolidated all the more easily when it extends across several adjacent 
states.”16 
Democratic Transition 
The path to democratic transition in Africa is a complex issue. A number of 
factors both external and internal have influenced the process of democratic transition. 
Though consideration of these factors is well beyond the scope of this research, a brief 
review, however, will highlight some of the factors at play, particularly as they pertain to 
democratic transition in Africa in the context of foreign aid and technical assistance 
conditionalities. 
Hippier, in a text titled The Democratization of Disempowerment.The problem of 
Democracy in The Third World, argued that African societies generally lack secure 
foundations. They have weak institutions, and they are economically dependent on the 
West and on world markets. These factors have left African nations vulnerable to wishes 
and commands of external actors.17 For instance, by the end of the Cold War, there was a 
strong desire for democratic governments to transform every non-democratic government 
into a democratic one.18 In an attempt to do so, observed Hyden and Bratton, the states 
l6Ibid., 54. 
l7Jochen Hippier, The Democratization of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in The 
Third World (London: Pluto Press, 1995), 1. 
18Ibid. 
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of the European Union and North America made development aid dependent on a 
country’s efforts towards democratization.19 
This desire for the democratization of non-democratic societies was a result of 
diminished competition between the superpowers.20 The Cold War competition between 
the United Sates and the Soviet Union led these two countries to define international 
security in terms of containment.21 As McCoy noted: 
Internal conflicts were inflamed and prolonged by external intervention. 
Tolerance of non-democratic governments was justified by the interests of 
stability, security, ideological compatibility, and even economic growth.22 
After the Cold War, concluded Donald Rothchild at a conference at the Carter 
Center of Emory University, the superpowers were no longer concerned with enlisting 
African allies in the global struggle against one another.2j As a result, the great powers 
withdrew, leaving the African countries on their own in a difficult economic and social 
environment.24 With support for authoritarian rulers no longer forthcoming, a democratic 
l9Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1992), 4 
“Jennifer L. McCoy, “Election-Monitoring and National Sovereignty,” Paper presented to The 
Council of Foreign Relations Project on Sovereignty and New World Politics, Washington, D,C, 12 
January 1995: 18. 
21 Ibid. 
“Ibid. 
“Donald Rothchild, “Democratic Change, Insurgent Action, and The Changing Patterns of 




renewal became evident in some two-thirds of the countries in Africa.25 
Most scholars agree that the pressure for Africa to move towards democracy was 
not caused only by external forces. Internal factors played a role too—perhaps the most 
important role. African populations have by no means been passive in the face of 
economic hardship and authoritarian rule. Students, civil servants, workers and 
professionals have regularly voiced their opinions about popular participation and 
democratic transition in strikes, demonstrations, marches and boycotts.26 Also, according 
to Ndue, opposition movements in countries like Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zaire all 
existed long before the collapse of the Eastern block regimes.27 
According to Schraeder, it is because of economic stagnation and decline, 
demonstrations against the continuous human rights abuses, and political repression that 
the ruling elites in Africa have been forced to negotiate with pro-democracy movements.28 
Schrader further stated that in countries where the state was insufficiently responsive to 
public demands and too frail to offer the necessary leadership in political and economic 
affairs, intense demands coming from disadvantaged groups at the periphery of society 
“Ibid. 
“Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, “Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands 
and State Responses,” in Governance and Politics in Africa, eds. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 27. 
27Ndue, 46. 
28Peter J. Schrader, “Political Elites and The Process of Democratization in Africa,” in The 
Democratization of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in The third World, ed. Jochen Hippier 
(London: Pluto Press, 1995), 44. 
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sometimes led to state breakdown and armed conflicts.29 This in turn ushered in an era of 
democratic transition. 
Transitional Approaches 
Richard Joseph, in his article “The Rebirth of Political Freedom,”30 cites seven 
models of African democratic transition that have emerged in the early 1990s. First is the 
national conference. This is described as a civilian coup which has as its objectives the 
removal of a particular government, the establishment of a transitional government, and 
the formulation of guidelines for multiparty elections. Examples of civilian coups were 
seen in Benin and the Republic of Congo in 1990 and 1991. Togo, Niger and 
Madagascar also experienced demands from civil society that led to national 
conferences.31 
Joseph’s second model is government change via democratic elections. This 
transition type was certainly an impressive accomplishment for many African countries 
considering that prior to the experiences in Benin in March of 1991, “No African country 
(excluding the island of Mauritius and Senegal, which experienced multi-party elections 
as early as 1963) has experienced government via multi-party elections.”j2 
The third model is the co-opted transition. This transition type describes events in 
which there are supposed to be transitional elections, but the incumbent regime controls 
29Ibid. 
30Richard Joseph, “Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom,’' Journal of Democracy 2, no., 4 




all avenues of the transition-thus making it impossible for the opposition to have a fair 
chance at competition, openness and verification. Such was the case in Côte d’Ivoire 
under the leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny (1990).33 
The fourth is guided democratization. In this case, represented most clearly in 
Guinea and Nigeria, a military regime retains virtually complete control of the process. 
The transitions here are complex and deliberately prolonged.34 
The fifth transition type is recalcitrance and piecemeal reforms. In this 
transitional model, the regime gives little room for democratic reform. The small 
concessions that are granted are controlled very closely so as not to allow any large 
democratic openings. For example, in the case of Kenya prior to 1992, Moi would not 
concede to multi-party election; however, he did consent to minor concessions by 
releasing a few prominent detainees and instituting such reforms as the abolition of 
“queue voting” and the restoration of judicial tenure.35 
Joseph’s sixth transition model is insurrections culminating in elections. South 
Africa and Namibia are examples of this transitional model.36 They were both able to 
facilitate transition through armed conflict followed by negotiations. 
The final transition model is the conditional transition. This occurs when 






the election results and reneges on concessions previously agreed upon.37 
While Joseph’s article describes succinctly types of transitions that have occurred 
since the end of the Cold War, this study attempts to look at transition from the point of 
view of causation. Three of these approaches - modernization, civil society, and 
institutional - focus on studies about the conditions of democracy, while only one, the 
conflict resolution approach, focuses on the transition process itself. 
Modernization: According to Hadenius, the basic tenet of the modernization 
school is that there is a positive linear relationship between economic and political 
development. That is to say, if economic development occurs, political development 
follows. The kind of economic development, said Hadenius, that can be measured by a 
country’s increased Gross National Product (GNP) and the degree of industrialization and 
the degree of urbanization.38 A social mobilization will then take place, according to 
Deutsch, one of the school’s leading advocates. This social mobilization brings about a 
breakdown in social and economic barriers, or race and thus opens up the potential for 
actual involvement in mass politics.39 
Huntington, who opposed the modernization theory in his work Political Order in 
Changing Societies, stated that modernization does not diminish the conflicts in society 
or in politics; rather, it aggravates them.40 The demand, he said, for change whether from 
37Ibid. 





above or outside results in uncertainty and is generally regarded as a threat. This threat 
accentuates the need for group identity and the protection of traditional values. This of 
course does not give rise to social transformation or politically favorable social 
environments, but to mass confusion.41 
Civil Society: The Civil Society Approach, as opposed to the modernization 
approach, argues that any effort to bring about democratic change needs a strong civil 
society to ensure that the transition ends with full or total democratization.42 According 
to Bayart, Civil Society is composed of those associations that are in direct touch with the 
State and have the capacity to break the State’s intimidating powers.43 
Diamond is more precise in his definition, saying that civil society is a: 
... realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self- 
supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared 
rules. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it involves citizens acting 
collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, 
exchange information, achieve mutual goals, made demands on the state, and hold 
state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing 
between the private sphere and the state.44 
The civil society approach claims that civil society produces resources necessary 
for social groups and political parties to balance and limit state power, and gives citizens 
4lIbid„ 81. 
42Lui, 12. 
"Jean-Francois Bayart in Peter P. Ekeh, “The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and 
Politics in Democratic Transition in Africa” in Democratic Transition in Africa, ed. B. Caron, A. Gboyega 
and E. Osaghea (Nigeria: Intec Printers Limited, 1992), 195. 
44Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of 
Democracy> 5, no.3 (July 1994): 5. 
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the opportunities to acquire the skills to use these resources.4:1 
Civil society also provides diverse avenues for democratic participation. It 
organizes citizens who can then begin to build and articulate social interests and 
differences of opinion. These are considered as important elements of the democratic 
political process.46 By focusing on working from the grassroots up to influence policy, 
the civil society approach considers the development of civil liberties to be more basic to 
democracy than the development of political competitiveness.47 According to Diamond, 
this concept of civil society can be seen in places like Southern Europe and Latin 
America.48 Through the mobilization of the strong civil society in these places, political 
transition has moved beyond liberalization to full democratization.49 In other places like 
the Philippines and South Korea, “intense mobilization by a wide variety of organizations 
and movements in civil society proved crucial in bringing about the demise of 
authoritarian regimes.”50 
Institutional: Unlike the civil society approach to democratic transition, McCoy 
argued that the institutional approach grants a great deal of power to external forces. 




48Larry Diamond and Marc Planner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: 




institutions.51 The need for countries to be acknowledged among other nations as having 
a legitimate government and to gain acceptance in the world community also affects the 
democratization process.52 In "Rethinking African Democracy,” Ake argued that the 
extent to which democracies succeed depends in part on the international donor 
community, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 
West, he said, has already proven that the withholding of development assistance, aid and 
investments does encourage the support of human rights and democracy.53 
Conflict Resolution: Cheng, on the other hand, argued that the outcome of 
democratic transition depends on the conflict resolution approach or the strategic 
approach. This approach primarily deals with the strategies of the pro-democracy 
movement and the incumbent government. According to Cheng: 
The success of democratic transition has been largely attributed to the political 
entrepreneurship of the new opposition, as related in its ability to set the agenda, 
to use extra legal methods in finessing repressive legal framework to shift the 
bargaining areas, and events to force the ruling elite to institute a new set of 
rules.54 
Huntington has also stated that most transitions are brought about by some form 
of negotiation “explicit or implicit, overt or covert, between government and opposition 
5lLui, 9. 
52McCoy, 13. 
53Claude Ake, “Rethinking African Democracy," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 64. 
34T. J. Cheng, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” World Politics 41, no., 4 
(1989): 474. 
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groups’ resulting in some form of treaty or pact negotiation.”55 
For example, the Angola-Namibia accords of December 1988 took the form of 
negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, brokered by the United States and 
the then Soviet Union.56 
Treaty or pact negotiations in many cases have built into the process external 
mediation. In many instances, said Clapham, these negotiations have to meet the moral 
expectations of those who mediated them, and who would be required to guarantee their 
implementation.57 These expectations in turn are heavily influenced by the values of 
Western liberal society and calls for the creation of a constitutional framework that 
includes multi-party competition for electoral support and a respect for basic human 
rights.58 According to Clapham, there are two ways in which this outcome could be 
achieved. In the first of these: 
. . . appropriate topics for negotiation are restricted to the precise form of powers 
of the executive branch, the level of autonomy accorded to ethnic or regional sub¬ 
units, and the entrenchment of the rights of minorities.59 
Once these are agreed upon, open multi-party elections are held under 
international supervision, the results of which determine the leadership and composition 
of the successor regime. The settlements negotiated for Angola in 1991-1992 and 
5SHuntington, 114. 
56Christopher Clapham, “Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking.” Journal of Peach Research 35, 





Mozambique in 1992-94 fell into this pattern.60 
Clapham described the second case as involving the formation of a broad-based 
coalition government. This is normally a transitional arrangement introducing a period of 
peace accompanied by appropriate confidence-building measures, such as the 
disarmament of the previously warring factions under international supervision.61 During 
this period, the formulation of a permanent constitution leading to multi-party elections 
and the installation of a new government could be established. Attempts to mediate 
solutions to the conflicts in Liberia followed this pattern.62 
Finally, the implementation of these agreements is to be guaranteed by the 
presence of an international peace-keeping force.63 Normally but not always, the United 
Nations would provide this function. Peace-keeping forces would be available to help 
with the aid of external observers, to secure the conditions required for free and fair 
elections, to supervise the installation of the new regime, and to remain for a period of 










A growing number of Western donor organizations are seeking to nudge 
authoritarian regimes toward greater openness. According to Carothers, author of 
Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania f in the early and mid-1980s the 
USAID and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) began to develop democracy related 
assistance programs, particularly in Latin America. Democracy assistance grew rapidly in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the Cold War ended and the global democratic trend 
spread dramatically to Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa and 
parts of Asia.66 
For almost a decade, promoting democracy has been a priority of U.S. foreign 
assistance. Several hundred million dollars of U.S. funds have been devoted annually to 
encourage democracy, noted Carothers. The U.S. government is by no means the only 
actor in this growing field.67 U.S. private foundations are increasingly involved, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Democracy promotion is now on the bilateral assistance agendas of many other 
Western countries, including Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Elolland, Denmark, France 
and Sweden. It is now also pursued by a number of multilateral organizations, including 
the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
'"Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, D.C.: 




in Europe, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity and a 
host ofNGOs.68 
Global Goals, Contentions Means: Issues of Multiple Aid Conditionality,69 a 
policy essay issued by the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C., states 
that since 1989 most bilateral and multilateral aid donors have announced the addition of 
new priorities for some old objectives and have added other objectives to their agenda. 
Among these are poverty reduction, democratic government, respect for human rights, 
improved governance, environmental protection, and reduced military expenditures. All 
of these objectives require appropriate policies within aid-receiving countries. Thus, 
industrialized nations and multilateral organizations are considering ways in which to 
influence policy reform in poorer nations. Recently attention has turned to the tool of 
conditionality - linking aid to progress on policy reform - which was used extensively by 
aid donors throughout the 1980s to promote economic reform.70 
The use of democracy assistance is often tied to some form of conditionality, said 
Tomasevski. Her book Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited,71 stated that 
democratic conditionalities to aid have weakened the prior linkage to economic assistance 
and human rights, a concept that has been reduced, in recent years, to meaning multi- 
68Ibid. 
69Joan M. Nelson and Stéphane J. Eglinton, Global Goals, Contentions Means: Issues of Multiple 
Aid Conditionality (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1992), 9. 
70Ibid., 10-11. 
7lKatarina K. Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited (London: Pinter 
Publishers Ltd., 1993), 13. 
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party elections. According to Tomasevski, this occurs for several reasons: 
(a) ... donors are using ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ interchangeably, while in 
practice concentrating on support for multi-party elections. This may well result 
in the replacement of human rights by democracy and the loss of donor interest in 
human rights once elected governments are in place. 
(b) Democracy has been confined to electoralism where countries are labeled 
‘democratic’ as soon as elections have taken place. The fact that democracy takes 
centuries to develop is forgotten, (c) It is assumed that such instant ‘democracy’ 
can and will guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms72 
Another conditionality that international assistance is often tied to is democracy. 
In “Democracy, Confusion or Chaos: Political Conditionality in Kenyaf Grosh and 
Orvis argued that tying economic aid to democracy is a mistake.73 Such was the case in 
1991, when Kenya was denied economic aid until the country complied with donors’ 
request for multi-party elections.74 Grosh and Orvis suggested that instead of forced 
conditionalities, donors should carefully define the goals of political conditionality and 
separate them from economic conditionality by providing separate budgets for aid for 
each area.7’’ 
Crawford’s study, “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of 
Effectiveness and Consistency,”76 also supports this argument. Crawford examined the 
implementation of political conditionality by four official aid donors (Sweden U.K., U.S., 
72Ibid„ 14. 
7:iBarbara Grosh and Stephen Orvis, “Democracy, Confusion, or Chaos: Political Conditionality in 
Kenya,” Studies in Comparative International Development 31, no., 4 (Winter 1996-97): 46. 
74Ibid. 
75Ibid„ 47. 
76Gordon Crawford, “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issue of Effectiveness and 
Consistency,” Democratization 4, no., 3 (Autumn 1997): 69. 
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and European Union) in the 1990s. The study explored the aid sanctions taken globally 
to insure improvements regarding human rights and democratic principles and assessed 
donor policy practice along two lines - effectiveness and consistency.77 
The study maintained that the effectiveness of political conditionalities would 
increase only if the political reform required in order for aid to resume is precise. An 
increase in consistency could be obtained if the donors have little economic and strategic 
interest in a particular country and the donor government has the political will to 
implement them rigorously.78 
U.S. Foreign Policy 
U.S. foreign policy towards Africa can be analyzed in three segments: economic, 
security and political reform, or democratization. On the economic front, the Congress 
and the Administration have advanced a new framework for promoting greater trade and 
investment with Africa - The President’s partnership for Growth and Opportunity in 
Africa.79 This emphasis on trade and investment, and the alleged (decline in 
commitments to development cooperation), have kindled a debate about what is the right 
mix of development assistance, debt reduction, trade incentives and investment 
promotion needed to support economic growth and sustainability development in 
77Ibid. 
78Ibid„ 87-88. 
79Africa Policy Information Center (Washington, D.C.,: Africa Policy Information Center, 1998): 
2. 
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Africa.80 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has listed the passage of the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act as one of the four top U.S. foreign policy priorities for 
1998.81 
On the security front, the Administration has continued to develop its year-old 
African Crisis Response Initiative by providing training and communications equipment 
to select African armies.82 Critics challenge the practicality of the plan because of 
unanswered questions regarding how much capacity building efforts can be turned into 
the mobilization of a regional African force to intervene in specific areas to promote 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, or other conflict prevention or resolution roles. 
The implementation of this initiative has, however, created a new discussion on U.S. 
security cooperation in Africa and raised import budgetary and national security issues.83 
On the third front, political reform or democratization, the Clinton Administration 
has not offered a particular framework for supporting African efforts to establish systems 
of more accountable governance guided by the rule of law and respect for human rights.84 
However, the importance of this problem in such priority countries as Nigeria, Congo and 
Kenya has forced analysts and practitioners to rethink their assumptions about the course 
80Donald M. Snow and Euene Brown, Beyond the Water’s Edge: An Introduction to U.S. Foreign 
Policy {New York: St. Martin Press, 1997), 303. 





of political change in Africa.87 Recently the emphasis in these debates has shifted from 
the mechanics of multi-party elections to issues of legal and constitutional reform and the 
role of civil society.86 
In the recent Regional Summit on Africa that was held in Atlanta in May 1998, 
organizers stated that it is in U.S. national interest to have a stable, successful Africa. In 
order for Africa to become a full participating member of the global economy, the U.S. 
must help Africa in its search to build institutional capacity, promote democratic 
participation and promote respect for human rights. To achieve this goal, the U.S. must 
make democracy, human rights, and the rule of law a central part of its African policy.87 
U.S. Democracy Assistance 
Democracy assistance gained prominence in the U.S. in the early to mid-1980s as 
one of the three main elements of the Reagan Administration foreign policy agenda 
(economic and security concerns were the other two).88 To foster democracy assistance, 
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a government-funded but privately-run 
organization committed to promoting democracy abroad, was established in 1984 with an 
$18 million annual budget (today, NED’s budget is $30 million). USAID eventually 
replaced NED as the front runner for providing democracy assistance. However, NED 
8SIbid. 
86Snow and Brown, 327. 
87Democracy and Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: The National Summit on Africa: Synopsis 
for Policymakers, April 1998): 2. 
88Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy,” Democratization 4, no., 
3 (Autumn 1997): 111. 
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funding marked a new trend in democracy assistance.89 
United States Agency for International Development democracy programming got 
its start in the mid-1980s as series of programs in Central America related to elections, 
judicial reform, and civic education.90 In the early 1990s democracy-related programming 
expanded and grew rapidly throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union.91 Spending on such assistance by the U.S. government grew to 
approximately $400 million per year, and internal bureaucratic structures were developed 
to institutionalize democracy promotion within the USAID.92 
U.S. democracy assistance is based on three main categories: the electoral arena, 
governmental institutions, and civil society. The main emphasis within the electoral 
arena is the holding of elections (presidential, parliamentary and local). Aid consists of 
technical assistance to electoral commissions to improve the administration of elections, 
support for voter education campaigns (implemented by local civic groups or in some 
cases by electoral commissions), and election monitoring by international delegations or 
domestic organizations formed for that purpose.9j Another area of emphasis in the 





93Michele Schimpp, The US Agency for International Development and Elections Support: A 
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programs designed to strengthen the main political parties, primarily through technical 
assistance and training on campaign methods and institutional development.94 
The secondary category, democracy aid for governmental institutions, seeks to 
help build democracy from the top down. In instances where democratic transition 
includes writing a new constitution, the U.S. often offers constitutional assistance, 
typically consisting of expert advice, conferences, exchange visits and seminars on 
constitutionalist and constitutional analysis.95 The most common type of democratic 
assistance in this category is parliamentary assistance. Programs usually consist of 
training for staff and members of parliament and technical assistance for parliamentary 
libraries, research units, and public affairs offices. The goal is to strengthen the overall 
institutional capacities of parliaments and help them operate in a more effective manner.96 
Another area in this category is judicial reform. This area includes training of 
judges, prosecutors, and other legal personnel, technical assistance relating to court 
administration, underwriting the publication of decisions, providing law books and legal 
materials and supporting the establishment of arbitration mechanisms and other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution.97 
The third and final category for democracy assistance is civil society. In practice, 
94Joshua Muravchik aU.S. Political Parties Abroad,” The Washington Quarterly 12, no., 3 (1989): 
94. 
95Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance, 64. 
%Rayan S. McCannell, Legislative Strengthening: A Synthesis of USAID Experience (Washington, 
D.C.: USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1995), 19. 
97Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin American in the 
Reagan Years (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991), 196. 
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U.S. assistance in this area falls within three categories - advocacy-oriented NGOs, media 
and unions. However, the most popular type of U.S. civil society assistance is for 
advocacy NGOs, such as human rights groups, election monitoring organizations, and 
environmental organizations.98 A few examples of these civil society organizations are 
the National Committee of Election Observers (CNOE) in Madagascar, the National 
Organization for Civic Education and Elections Monitoring (NOCEM) in Uganda, the 
Institute for Education in Democracy in Kenya, and the Study and Research Group on 
Democratic, Economic and Social Development in Arica (GERDDES) throughout 
Francophone west and central Africa.99 It is in this arena, (civil society) that the Africa 
Regional Electoral Assistance Fund has focused much of its attention and resources so 
that civil society would be strengthened.100 The AREAF uses technical assistance as well 
as its ability to provide international election observers to promote democratic transition 
as well as encouraging the development of an engaged civil society.101 While focused on 
specific elections, AREAF also seeks to promote sustainability through providing 
electoral codes, private and public organizational frameworks, and broad-based 
participation in the entire process.102 
This brief literature review points to a crucial role that democracy assistance plays 
98Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance, 64. 
"Democracy and Human Rights (Washington, D.C.,: The National Summit on Africa: A Synopsis 
for Policy Makers, April 1998): 25. 




in moving a country forward on the road to democratization. The types of transitional 
approaches (modernization, civil society, conflict resolution, and institutional) are also of 
substantial importance to this study. One recognizes that these approaches to transition 
are ideal types and that democratic transitions do not exist in a vacuum. Democratic 
transitions often times occur simultaneously where two or more transition types overlap 
each other, making it rather difficult to distinguish the actual causes of transition. 
However, for the purposes of this study, the main causes of transition are identified in 
each country and linked to one of the four aforementioned transition types. The 
objective, therefore, of this study is to examine the relationship between assistance 
provided by AREAF and the nature of the democratic transition in the selected countries. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The research design and the method of analysis used in this study is, first, 
exploratory. Exploratory studies are appropriate when a researcher is examining a new 
interest or the subject is relatively new and unstudied.1 Although democratic transition is 
not a new phenomenon and there are recent studies on transition, there has been little 
research on the African Regional Electoral Assistance fund and its relationship, to 
democratic transition. This type of study is typically done for three purposes: (1) to 
satisfy the researcher's curiosity and desire for better understanding. (2) to test the 
feasibility of undertaking a more careful study and (3) to develop the methods employed 
in a more careful study.2 In this case, this study serves as a beginning point for future 
work to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of democracy assistance programs like 
the AREAF. 
Second, this research is descriptive. The purpose of a descriptive study is to 
describe situations and events. Much of this research is founded on a clear description of 
democracy and democratic transitions in Africa, with particular emphasis on Kenya, Côte 





d’Ivoire and Uganda. In this case, the researcher will give a brief political history of each 
country and the events that led to transitional elections and involvement of organizations 
such as AREAF. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Primary data were collected during an internship at the African-American Institute 
from January 1993 through August 1993; from the Final Report of the Africa Regional 
Electoral Assistance Fund, issued in 1996; Africa Confidential, Africa Research Bulletin', 
and from an independent evaluation prepared by Checchi and Company Consulting Inc. 
The secondary data were collected from scholarly journals and books. 
Assistance Packages of Election Observation Services 
Different services were provided to countries with varying degrees of success, 
such as election assessments, election monitoring, civic education and training and 
parallel vote tabulations. These services were categorized into assistance packages. 
Listed here are the major services offered by AREAF, broken down into three assistance 
packages. They are the basic, intermediate and full-service packages. 
In the basic package, AREAF conducts a pre-election assessment in which the 
monitoring agency surveys the country’s electoral framework (the role of the media, the 
role of NGOs and political parties and other civic organizations). The monitoring agency 
meets with the elected or appointed officials of the ruling party, the opposition party, 
members of the clergy, civic organizations, and local NGOs. The monitoring agency also 
reviews the electoral code and checks on the progress of the voters’ registration process. 
31 
The monitoring agency then arranges for a group of international observers to monitor the 
election process. 
The second package is the intermediate package. As in the basic package, the 
intermediate package also allows for a pre-election assessment and a review of the 
electoral code and checks on the progress of voter’s registration. Some special features of 
the intermediate package are the seminars and workshops that focus on expanding party 
bases of support (for example, encouraging parties to promote the involvement of women 
and other neglected constituencies in the election process). The intermediate package 
also provides a foundation for political party training, platform development, campaign 
management and coalition building training for emerging political parties as well as the 
existing government. This package also includes external experts who train local and 
regional civic groups to take part in poll-watcher exercises in addition to a team of 
international election observers to monitor the election. 
The third package is called the full package. This package features all the 
technical and electoral services of the basic and intermediate packages in addition to the 
provision of commodities (such as ballot boxes, registration cards, polling stations, fax 
machines, two-way radios, computer) and parallel vote tabulation. Parallel vote 
tabulations are “Projections of vote results based on a statistical sample of actual results 
at the voting sites.”3 Observers are assigned voting sites in which to observe the vote 
count, record the results, and then call, radio, or fax in the results to a national computer 
Tennifer L. McCoy, “Election-Monitoring and National Sovereignty,” Paper presented to The 
Council of Foreign Relations Project on Sovereignty and New World Politics, Washington, D.C., 12 
January 1995: 1 1. 
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center. The sample projections usually come within two or three percentage points of the 
actual results. 
Characteristics of Transitional Approaches 
Each approach to democratic transition has specific characteristics that aid in 
identification. The characteristics of the modernization approach to transition are: 
industrialization, urbanization, economic development, social development, decentralized 
government, number of universities/students, number of printed magazines, number of 
newspapers, number of television sets, radios, etc. 
The characteristics of the civil society approach to transition are: increased 
number of social groups, neighborhood organizations, special interest groups, 
local/regional organizations, labor unions, student organizations, and the formation of 
women’s organizations or groups. 
Characteristics of the institutional approach to transition are: an appeal by a donor 
nation to increase popular participation, the reduction or loss of aid from organizations 
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and an increase in activity by 
international non-governmental organizations that foster political participation. 
And finally, characteristics of the conflict resolution approach to transition are: 
national conventions, talks between the ruling party and the opposition, treaties/pacts, 
negotiations or bargaining and adoption of a new constitution. 
CHAPTER IV 
ELECTIONS IN KENYA - 1992 
Kenya is a country on the east coast of Africa. It extends from The Indian Ocean 
deep into the interior of Africa. The equator runs through the center of Kenya. In 1995, 
the population was officially estimated at 30,522,000.' About 99 percent of Kenya’s 
population is made up of Africans. Other population groups, in order of size, are Asian 
Indians, Europeans and Arabs. Kenya’s indigenous Africans belong to about 40 different 
ethnic groups. The largest group, the Kikuyu, make up about 20 percent of Kenya’s 
population. Four other ethnic groups - the Kalenjin, Jamba, Luhya and Luo - each make 
up between 10 and 15 percent of the population.2 The official language is English; 
however, Swahili is widely used for communication between people of different ethnic 
groups.3 
The modem era in Kenya politics commenced in 1960 when negotiations began to 
establish the country’s independence from Great Britain.4 The British had been active in 
Kenya since 1895 when the country became a British protectorate. By 1920, Kenya had 
1 W.T. Morean, “Kenya,” in Africa South of the Sahara, 27th ed. (London: Europa Publication 






become a colony of the British Empire.5 White settlers occupied most of the country’s 
land that was suitable for farming, and later, Indian immigrants began to dominate retail 
trade.6 During this period, the land problems, rising unemployment and lack of a voice in 
the colonial government led to disaffection among most Kenyans.7 
The Kenya African Union (KAU) was established in 1944 as a means to address 
the complaints of indigenous Kenyans related particularly to land issues in Kikuyu areas. 
Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu and previously the KAU representative in the United Kingdom) 
was chosen president of the KAU in 1947, as a result of the slow pace of action on land 
issues. In 1952, a secret Kikuyu society known as the Mau Mau began a series of terrorist 
acts against British settlers.8 A year later, KAU was banned after it was mistakenly 
linked to Mau Mau rebellion, Jomo Kenyatta was imprisoned and a state of emergency 
was imposed.g 
As Kenya began its transition to independence, the state of emergency in place 
since 1956 was lifted and two principle political parties emerged: the Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU 
’Robert Maxon, Struggle for Kenya (Toronto: Associated University Press, 1993), 13. 
’Robert Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1976), 15. 
7Allen Rake, “Kenya,” in Africa South of the Sahara, 27th ed. (London: Europa Publications 
Limited, 1998), 550. 
sIbid. 
’International Republican Institute for International Affairs, “Kenya: The December 29, 1992 
Elections” (Washington, D.C.: International Republican Institute, 1992): 2. 
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was dominated by the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups. KADU included primarily 
members of various minority ethnic groups.10 
The Kenyatta Era 
Jomo Kenyatta was released from jail in August 1961 and named president of 
KANU. KANU won national elections against KADU in May 1963 and in December 
1963, Kenya established its full independence, with Kenyatta as Prime Minister. By 
1965, political divisions began to arise within KANU between the party's conservative 
wing, led by Secretary General Tom Mboya, and the radical wing, led by Vice President 
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Odinga abandoned KANU and formed the Kenya People’s 
Union (KPU), which accused the government of “promoting vigorously the development 
of a small privileged class of Africans.”11 
One year later, during the by-elections, only nine of the thirty parliamentarians 
who joined the KPU were returned to parliament. Later that year, the upper and lower 
houses of parliament were merged in a unicameral house and in January 1967, Minister of 
Home Affairs Daniel Arap Moi was promoted to vice president, replacing Odinga.12 The 
Kenyatta government moved Kenya into a de facto one-party state. Ethnic tensions grew, 
especially among the Luo, who perceived that their power was being usurped by the 
l0Norman Miller and Roger Yeager, Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview 




Kikuyus, inciting a series of violent Luo-Kikuyu clashes. During the same week, Odinga 
was arrested and KPU banned.1’ 
Jomo Kenyatta, whose rule had become increasingly autocratic, died on August 
22, 1978, at the age of 82. The Kikuyu-Luo domination of Kenya politics ended when 
Vice president Moi became president.14 
The Moi Era 
Moi was elected president of KANU on October 14. 1978 to complete Kenyatta’s 
five-year presidential term. In legislative elections the following November, more than 
740 candidates ran for parliamentary seats under KANU’s one-party system. As with 
previous elections, almost half of the incumbents were defeated. Shortly after the 
elections, two developments signaled Moi’s desire for closer relations with the United 
States: the appointment of Dr. Robert Ouko as Foreign Minister, and the arrival of a 
negotiating team from Washington to begin talks on U.S. access to Kenyan military 
facilities.1'' 
In June 1982, following months of political disturbances and attempts to form 
opposition parties, parliament voted to amend the constitution making Kenya officially a 
one-party state.16 On August 1, a division of the Kenyan Air Force attempted a coup 
against Moi’s government. Forces loyal to Moi quickly crushed the rebellion, which 
,3Ibid. 
HMiller and Yeager, 58. 
l5“Kenya: December 29, 1992 Elections,” 4. 
l6Ibid. 
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lasted only a few hours, but more than 3,000 soldiers and civilians were arrested. The 
official death toll was 159; however, some Kenyan political parties and media accounts 
indicated thousands were killed.17 
Following the attempted coup, the climate of fear and suspicion culminated in 
May 1983 with Moi’s declaration that foreign powers had conspired to replace him with 
the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Charles Njonjo. Njonjo later resigned his cabinet 
post and seat in parliament. Moi also called for national elections a year earlier than 
mandated. Only 48 percent of the eligible voters participated in the September 26, 1983, 
elections.18 Moi ran unopposed for the presidency and was re-elected to another five-year 
term. 
During the following years, Moi was plagued by continuous student oppositions 
and demonstrations. In 1984, Moi met with student leaders in an effort to diffuse tension 
over a national youth service program and syllabus restructuring. In February 1985, 
following student clashes with police during which one student was killed and 65 were 
injured, Nairobi University was closed. Although the school reopened in April, 
disturbances in early 1986 again forced its closing for two months.19 
Political unrest escalated again in March 1986 when the government uncovered 
what it considered to be a political plot by opposition forces. Early the following year, 





focus attention on Moi’s government. In March 1988, National Assembly election 
primaries were conducted using the queue system,20 which led to international charges of 
intimidation and fraud in the process.21 Shortly thereafter, Moi demoted his popular Vice 
President, Mwai Kibaki, to Minister of Health and replaced him with the relatively 
unknown Josephat Karanja.22 In July, the National Assembly amended the constitution to 
extend the period of detention for suspected criminals from 24 hours to two weeks, and to 
give the president authority to replace judges without reason. These actions increased 
international human rights groups’ condemnation of the Moi government.23 
Until the mid-1980s, the press in Kenya was among the freest in Africa; 
nevertheless, self-censorship, intimidation and repression by the government curtailed the 
free flow of information. The penal code allowed the government to ban any publication 
in the interest of public order, health, morals or national security. The foreign-owned 
newspapers accommodated the new political realities by engaging in self-censorship in 
order to avoid potential hostile government actions. Press freedom began to erode 
considerably in 1985 with numerous detention of journalists critical of the government. 
A once-lively press became cautious and self-censoring under threat of impoundment, 
:oThe queue system of voting was developed for use in societies where a high percentage of the 
population is illiterate, or where fraud involving ballots and ballot boxes has become so rampant that no 
confidence remains for secret ballots. Voters line up for the candidate of the choice at the polling site and 
are counted by officials; the results are entered on tally sheets for reporting. 




permanent closure, violence or detention of its publishers and journalists.24 
Since independence, Kenya has received substantial amounts of development aid. 
In 1982 Kenya asked its main donors to provide additional balance-of-payment support to 
help to halt the serious economic decline. The U.S. responded with a $77 million 
pledge.25 In 1986 the World Bank pledged $900 million and in 1988 donor commitment 
for 1989 totaled $100 million. In 1989 the Federal Republic of Germany, Kenya’s 
principal bilateral creditor, announced that it would cancel the total debit of U.S. $435 
million in return for increased Kenyan investment in projects aimed at protecting the 
environment.26 
Transitional Approach 
Elections in Kenya came primarily at the urging of the international community. 
According to Miller and Yeager in Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity, at the end of 1991 
bilateral and multilateral creditors suspended aid to Kenya for 1992, pending the 
acceleration of both economic and political reforms. In particular, the donors stressed the 
desirability of an improvement in Kenya’s human rights record.27 
In early December 1991, Moi, called a special conference of KANU delegates in 
response to the international and domestic pressure for speedy reform. Moi submitted to 
24“Kenya: December 29, 1992 Elections,” 5. 
25“Kenya: A miracle Laid Bare,” Africa Confidential 33, no., 1 (10 January 1992): 4. 
26Ibid. 
27Millerand Yeager, 108. 
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these pressures and decided to permit the opening of a multi-party a political system.28 
Soon afterwards, the national assembly approved appropriate amendments to the 
constitution. Several new political parties were registered in the beginning of 1992 in 
preparation for the elections to be held later that year.29 
Kenya’s move towards democracy falls within the institutional approach towards 
democratic transition, and although this is an ideal type of transitional approach, it does in 
part describe the main events that caused the transition. The institutional approach holds 
that external pressure can bring about change, including the formation of new institutions. 
Such an occurrence was clearly illustrated by the international donor community’s 
insistence that Kenya make drastic changes to its political and social climate if it desired 
international aid. 
Election Assistance 
The International Republican Institute and the African-American Institute worked 
together in providing election observation and assistance to Kenya. The AREAF 
provided a total of $1,044,916 for both the presidential and legislative elections projects. 
The aid was used, first of all, to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the pre-election 
environment to determine the feasibility of organizing an international election observer 
mission in Kenya. The AREAF delegation met with individuals from the government of 




governmental organizations throughout the country. They superficially sought to assess 
the country’s electoral framework as well as the role of the media, the NGOs and the 
political parties.30 This analysis of the pre-election environment was encouraging, but the 
team reported concerns that “the overall process was significantly compromised by the 
government of Kenya on behalf of the ruling party.”31 
During the second phase of the Kenyan mission, the International Republican 
Institute (ISI) fielded a team of international observers for the general elections. The 
objective of the Kenyan election observer mission was to provide some deterrence to 
election day fraud, to offer international moral and political support for those engaged in 
the process, and to report to the international community on the conduct of the election.’2 
The presence of international election observers apparently did help reassure Kenyans 
that elections would take place, but did little to ensure complete transparency or 
openness. The AREAF funds were used for travel expenses to and from Kenya, travel 
within the country, and hotel and per-diem cost for sixty observers. Approximately 5.5 
million voters (more than 65 percent of the registered voters) cast ballots for civic, 
parliamentary and presidential candidates on December 29. There were 713 candidates 
for the 188 seats in parliament, seventeen of which were uncontested. There were more 
than 7,000 polling stations, many of which were located in rural areas in schools, 
community centers, church halls, outdoor soccer fields, and village centers. According to 
30AREAF Final Report, 68. 
31Ibid. 
32“Kenya” (Washington, D.C.: International Republican Institute), 29, December 1992, 41. 
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early reports by some observers, voting was delayed throughout the country, with a few 
exceptions. As reported by some observers, late starts in various places was caused by 
difficulty in the delivery set-up, unavailability of election materials, late changes in 
polling place locations, transportation difficulties, and inexperienced and/or insufficiently 
trained personnel.33 The observers also noted that there were administrative irregularities 
throughout the country. For example, many ballot boxes were not properly sealed with 
the retaining bolt as required by electoral law. Party seals were intermittently used while 
Election Commission seals appeared to have been more frequently applied.34 
Problems with registration were also evident. Observers reported that some 
citizens were disenfranchised through lapses in the reproduction of the registration books 
used by the polling clerks. Although some were able to document their registration, in a 
number of instances witnessed by the IRI team, citizens’ original registration forms were 
not readily available.35 In another instance, observers reported that improprieties related 
to registration lists may have also occurred. Observers witnessed the purchase of voters’ 
cards in Mombasa. The IRI discovered evidence to support complaints that registration 
lists were manufactured to allow for the importation of voters in Molo Constituency.36 
The team also noted that the slow start, the administrative irregularities, the lapses in 
provision of materials for the conduct of voting, and the registration problems all 
33Ibid. 
“Ibid., 45-47. 
35Ibid., Appendix 10, 2-3. 
36Ibid. 
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contributed to frustration for voters and election officials. There were also questions 
raised about whether or not the delays and lapses were systematic, or whether they were 
indicative of a focused effort to disadvantage a specific region or constituency.37 
Many observers were, however, impressed by the election-day enthusiasm of 
Kenyans. Overall, the citizens displayed heroic patience in the face of monumental 
delays, noted one team member. They demonstrated their commitment to a democratic 
transition, against a backdrop of deep-seated suspicion toward the government because of 
past election experiences and the government’s reluctance to move from a one-party to a 
multi-party state. Though IRI believed that the electoral environment was flawed, the 
observers witnessed balloting that allowed most Kenyans to actively participate in 
political process. As imperfect as these elections may have been, they nonetheless 




ELECTIONS IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE - 1995 
Côte d’Ivoire spans 340 miles of the West African Atlantic coast between Ghana 
and Liberia. It also has common borders with Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. The 
country area totals 124,503 square miles, about half that of Italy or Japan.1 About one- 
third of the country’s population consists of immigrants from neighboring countries who 
have been drawn there by the country’s relative prosperity.2 
For some 20 years following its independence, Côte d’Ivoire had a high rate of 
economic growth - with gross domestic product (GDP) increasing by an annual average 
of 11% in 1960-70 and 6%-7% in 1970-80 - figures which, according to the World Bank, 
brought it into the ranks of middle-income developing countries.3 During the 1980s, 
however, the economy entered a period of decline, caused mainly by a weakening of the 
international prices of the country’s major export commodities (coffee and cocoa) and a 
serious drought in 1982-84. 
By 1994, however, the economy had recovered.4 A return to a strong and 
'R. J. Harrison Church, “Côte d’Ivoire,” in Africa South of the Sahara, 27lh ed. (London: Europa 






sustained economic growth is welcomed in any country, but is particularly important in 
Côte d’Ivoire because of its high rate of population growth. At about 3.6% per year since 
1985, this west African nation is one of the fastest growing in the world, bringing the 
total population to an estimated 14.7 million by mid 1996. The rate of urbanization has 
also been rapid, with some 44% of the population residing in urban areas in 1995. One 
half of the population is less than twenty years old and a number of them are students and 
reside in Abidjan.5 
The Houphouet-Boigny Era 
Since independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has had two presidents. The Parti 
Démocratique de la côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) had maintained a monopoly on political life in 
Côte d’Ivoire and was the only political party. As party leader since 1960, Dr. Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny was the sole candidate for presidency at every election until 1990.6 
In 1989, as the economy continued on a downward spiral, Houphouet-Boigny 
invited a group of political leaders, critics and supporters, to Abidjan for what was called 
“five days of dialogue” in response to national discontent. Candid and sharp criticisms of 
the party and government over the five days conveyed a lack of confidence in the ruling 
elite. Participants in the “five days of dialogue” called for a more responsive party in the 
form of a multi-party system.7 
5Ibid„ 395. 
6Robert E. Handloff, Cote d’Ivoire: A Country Study’ (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research 
Division, 1991), xxv. 
7Ibid. 
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A few months later, on the advice of the World Bank, in an attempt to bring the 
economy under control, Houphouet-Boigny instituted strict austerity measures he thought 
would slow the fallen economy and bring in more revenues for the government. 
However, students took to the streets in protest of the announced wage cuts and tax 
increases. Demonstrators were also calling for a multi-party system of government. 
Often the protest turned into large scale demonstrations that at times turned into violent 
confrontations with police in the streets of Abidjan.8 In April and May 1990, army and 
air force recruits protesting the cost-cutting decision to limit their military service to a 
single tour of duty demonstrated in bases across Côte d’Ivoire. A group of armed air 
force recruits subsequently took over the international airport outside Abidjan for twelve 
hours. Police and firefighters also staged highly visible protests for higher wages. By 
mid-May Houphouet-Boigny had given up on the issue of military duty, agreed to higher 
wages for police and firefighters, and scrapped plans to increase income taxes.9 He 
instead appointed Alassane Ouattara, governor of the Banque Centrale de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest, to head a commission whose function would be to formulate adjustment 
measures that would be both more economically effective and more politically 
acceptable.10 Most significantly, in 1990 Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI legalized 
opposition parties and a multi-party political system. Opposition groups that had not 





system. A number of new political parties were also formed and participated in the 1990 
presidential and legislative elections. 
Houphouet-Boigny died in December 1993, and Henri Konan Bedié, the president 
of the National Assembly, was declared president in accordance with the constitution. He 
served the remainder of Houphouet-Boigny’s term and was elected president in 1995." 
Henri Bedié/Political Climate 
Building on the introduction of multi-party elections in Côte d’Ivoire in 1990, the 
country held its second multi-party elections in October and November of 1995. The 
major opposition parties boycotted the October 1995 election due to concerns about the 
electoral code’s candidacy requirements and voter’s registration irregularities.12 Although 
the country’s constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government 
peacefully through democratic means, the opposition complained that President Bedié 
and the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), which Bedié led, used the December 
1994 Electoral Code to place formidable obstacles in the path of political rivals."’ The 
Rassemblement des Républicains, the opposition party, maintained that Allasane 
Ouattara, a leading opposition rival of Bedié, had been banned from entering the 
presidential race because he did not satisfy the requirements of the electoral code with 
respect to parentage, residency, and citizenship.14 According to the U.S. State 
"Ibid. 
l2“Côte d’Ivoire: No Contest,” Africa Confidential 36, no., 21 (20 October 1995): 7. 
"Ibid. 
l4“Otimism All Round,” Africa Confidential 236, no. 7 (31 March 1995): 7. 
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Department’s human rights report, the opposition also cited faulty voter registration 
procedures and unfair restrictions on demonstrations after the government issued a three- 
month ban on marches and sit-ins attempt to guarantee public order.15 
Approaching Transition 
Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic transition falls under the civil society model and 
occurred in its first multi-party elections in 1990. The 1995 elections were Côte 
d'Ivoire’s second attempt at making multi-party elections a permanent fixture. Working 
through the United Nations, the government of Côte d’Ivoire extended an invitation to the 
international community to monitor elections. As a result of the U.N.’s call, a joint 
survey mission was conducted by the National Democratic Institute and the African- 
American Institute in effort to determine possible program activities that both groups 
could undertake to support the Ivorian electoral process. The objective of this mission 
was to witness the elections, not to supervise or to certify them. Ultimately, says NDI: 
. . .it is the Ivorian people who will determine the legitimacy of the 
elections. We sought to learn from the Ivorian people about the nature of 
their electoral process and its implications for the further development of 
Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic institutions.16 
The Côte d'Ivoire project received $1,087,306 for the presidential, legislative and 
municipal elections held in 1995. In addition to travel expenses to and from Côte 
d’Ivoire, within the country, and hotel and per-diem cost for 43 observers, the aid was 
l5U.S. Department of State, “Côte d’Ivoire Human Rights Practices, 1996” (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1996): 7. 
^“Preliminary Côte d’Ivoire Election Statement,” Press Release of the National Democratic 
Institute, 29 November 1995: 1. 
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used to design, conduct and implement a political party training program that focused on 
expanding party bases of support, encouraging parties to promote the involvement of 
women and other neglected constituencies in the electoral process, and sharing with 
Ivorian political leaders candidate selection methods used in advance of elections to 
improve party electoral chances.17 The first political party training seminar was devoted 
to campaign strategies and brought together sixty representatives from nine Ivorian 
political party groups and twelve representatives of major NGOs in Abidjan. The 
participants took part in role-playing exercises over a three-day period. They were asked 
to develop a campaign strategy, identify and cultivate resources, and select a candidate 
who would best present their team’s goals to an imaginary electorate. The trainers and 
workshop moderators included elected officials and experts from Belgium, Canada, 
Malawi, Sweden and the United States. 
Both AAI and NDI sponsored a joint delegation to the legislative election in 
November 1995. The joint delegation was comprised of forty-three observers from North 
America, Europe, and Africa. Observers included election officials, political organizers, 
academics, and members of professional and civic organizations. 
In addition to international observer activities, AAI provided direct support to 
Ivorian NGOs involved in the electoral process. The AAI worked with the Observatoire 
National des Elections (ONE), an umbrella organization made up of six Ivorian NGO, to 
conduct pre-electoral voter register verification as well as local observer training and 
deployment. The AAI also provided assistance to ONE for the deployment of 180 civil 
l7AREAF Final Report, 20. 
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society members to participate in voter register verification. In addition, the groups 
worked with ONE when it spearheaded a training session for 120 local monitors from 
various areas of the country and then deployed more than 100 trained monitors.18 
According to the final report, the delegation found that election day activities and 
tabulation during the legislative election were, for the most part, fairly transparent. 
However, the delegation expressed concern over the inaccuracy of the electoral lists, the 
high number of non-distributed voter cards, and the inconsistencies and delays in the 
implementation of the court-ordered procedure intended to allow eligible voters whose 
names did not appear on the electoral lists to cast ballots.19 The monitors noted that these 
elections signified the importance of assessing the pre-electoral environment and 






ELECTIONS IN UGANDA -1993 
The Republic of Uganda is bordered by Sudan to the north, Tanzania and Rwanda 
to the south, Kenya to the east and Zaire to the west. Most of the country is a plateau 
about 4,000 feet above sea level. Thick forest covers parts of the south, while the north is 
largely savanna, with semi-arid areas scattered through the northeast.1 Known as the 
“pearl of Africa,” Uganda's reliable rainfall and fertile soil make it well suited for 
agriculture. Growth of cash crops-coffee, tea, tobacco and sugar-accounts for slightly 
more than half of the GNP.2 Population density is directly related to the rainfall pattern, 
with the highest concentration in the areas of high rainfall. The Buganda, Banyakore. 
Buguso, Bakiga. Bunyoro and Luo are the largest ethnic groups in this nation, whose 
population exceeds 17 million. The rate of population growth continues to be among the 
highest in Africa.3 
Uganda received its independence on October 9, 1962, and Milton Obote was 
’B.W Langlands, “Uganda” in Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa Publications Limited 
1998), 1051. 





elected prime minister by the Uganda People's Congress (UPC).4 In 1967. however, the 
constitution was annulled and a new one took its place. The new constitution established 
an executive presidency, making Dr. Obote head of state; abolished all traditional rulers 
and legislatures; and postponed national elections until 1971. Members of parliament 
grew very distrustful of Obote, who did not remain in power long. In January 1971, 
General Idi Amin, second-in-command of the army, seized control of Uganda. 
Upon his takeover of the government, Amin made a number of gestures that were 
intended to gain the confidence of the Ugandan people. For example, he arranged for the 
release of 53 political detainees, toured the country, visited Britain and Israel, and 
announced a series of reversals in Uganda’s foreign policy, established closer contact 
with Kenya and initiated contact with South Africa.5 
It was not long before the Amin regime too began establishing laws that were not 
in the best interests of the Ugandan people. Amin suspended political activities and most 
civil rights and established a number of new government departments that were mainly in 
the area of state security. “To deflect public criticism and to enhance his domestic 
support, Amin adopted a controversial but highly popular program to Africanize the 
economy, by expelling more than 70,000 Asians from the country.”6 The National 
Assembly was dissolved, and Amin assumed power to rule by decree. The entire 
4Langlands, 1051. 
'Thomas P. Ofcansky, Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 44. 
6Ibid„ 44. 
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population was brought under the jurisdiction of military tribunals.7 Amin served as 
president until 1979, when he too was overthrown with the assistance by the government 
of Tanzania. Multi-party elections were held in 1980, and Obote was returned to power 
until 1986. 
Approaching Transition 
The National Resistance Army (NRA) and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who had 
been fighting against the Obote government for some time, took control of Uganda in 
January 1986 by means of a military coup.8 One of Museveni’s first acts as president was 
to form a broad-based government that included both civilian and military members and 
to establish a four-year timetable for drawing up a constitution and holding elections for a 
return to civilian democratic rule.9 Soon thereafter, Musevini announced that elections 
would not take place in 1989 as initially expected, but would be postponed for at least 
three years. Although political parties were not banned, their activities were officially 
suspended.10 In 1989, he again announced that he would extend his military government 
for another five years. He explained his efforts to extend his rule by claiming that further 






anti-government guerrilla activity, improve the judiciary, police force and civil service, 
and rehabilitate the country’s infrastructure.11 
“Lawlessness, banditry and indiscipline”12 remained common in Uganda, 
especially in the north. In March 1986, an opposition movement supporting the armed 
overthrow of Museveni, the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement (UPDM), was 
formed. Widespread opposition activity presented major problem for the government 
during the years 1987-1991. For example, large-scale uprisings led by Alice Lakwena 
attracted both peasant farmers from the Acholi ethnic group and former soldiers of the 
UNLA.13 In 1987, several thousand rebels were killed. In another incident, two 
opposition groups, the Federal Democratic group and the United National Front, formed 
and alliance aiming to overthrow President Museveni. Reports in 1988 of an aborted 
mutiny by members of Museveni’s his own army, the NRA, indicated dissension within 
the ranks of his own forces.14 
The 1992 Fluman Rights Report cited Museveni for publicly stating his resistence 
to multi-party politics, but openly welcoming such a system if it arose from the 
deliberation on a new constitution.15 Unlike Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda was 





I5U.S. Department of State, “Uganda Human Rights Practices,” 1994 (Washington. D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1994): 8. 
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approach to political transition. Still, the enormous amount of time that President 
Museveni spent trying to curb dissidents, outbreaks, and to abort coups and dissension 
within his NRA army provided continuing evidence of civil dissatisfaction among a large 
cross-section of citizens ranging from farmers to soldiers.16 After Museveni reneged on 
his promise to restore civilian rule, a Constitutional Commission was finally organized to 
draft a tentative constitution. An election was held in 1994 to elect a Constituent 
Assembly that was to be responsible for debating and adopting the constitution. 
Election Assistance 
Prior to beginning assistance, a joint assessment team of IRI and AAI 
representatives went to Uganda for a period of two weeks in 1993. The Uganda project 
received $1,280,447 for the Constitutional Assembly and the national elections that were 
to be held in 1996. According to the AREAF Final Report, the visiting assessment team 
consulted with the U.S. Embassy, USAID, the government of Uganda, NRA members, 
NRA Constitutional Commission members, the chair and deputy chair of the Constituent 
Assembly, opposition party members, and human rights and community leaders. Other 
relevant groups such as members of the press, academia, NGOs, and representatives from 
donor nations were also consulted to determine the best way to proceed in developing and 
implementing overall election support. The recommendations were to provide electoral 
assistance in the form of civic education and domestic monitoring. This support was 
intended to provide a foundation for national elections. The funds were used not only for 
16Alan Rake, “Uaanda” in Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa Publications Limited. 
1997), 1019. 
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election monitoring, but also for a series of seven seminars that facilitated the active 
involvement of Ugandan citizens in the constitution-making process. The AAI organized 
seminars, conferences, workshops, publications, and forums on all aspects of democratic 
institution building. The forums provided interested parties with avenues to express their 
ideas and have those ideas transmitted to the Constituent Assembly. Seminar participants 
were also asked to host discussions in their hometowns or villages about the relevance of 
the constitution in order to promote a greater understanding of constitutional issues at the 
grassroots level. 
In preparation for the election, the IRI implemented a program of poll-watcher 
training for candidates’ agents as well as a civic education program for political parties. 
To assist political parties in their own internal development capabilities, the IRI 
conducted a workshop with representatives from the parties, the NRM, and NGOs to 
discuss how Uganda should move toward democracy. This training concentrated on how- 
political parties can more effectively use the avenues open to them to engage in political 
debate under the current government restrictions. The IRI also conducted regional 
candidate poll-watcher seminars to train candidates and their agents about the monitoring 
and poll-watching provisions of Uganda’s electoral law and to provide organizational 
support to the parties and coordinated poll-watching activities. 
The IRI and AAI administered an assistance program that included training 
Ugandan election monitors and civic education trainers and providing technical assistance 
and equipment (fax machines, two-way radios, antennas) to the independent election 
commission. The assistance team worked with two umbrella groups, the Uganda Joint 
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Christian Council (UJCC), composed of the Catholic Church and most of the Protestant 
denominations, and the National Organization for Civic Education and Monitoring 
(NOCEM), which comprised approximately 13 NGOs. Training workshops were 
organized, and a total of 16,000 local election monitors and approximately 4,000 civic 
education trainers participated in these sessions. The trainees were deployed during the 
campaign at candidates’ meetings (the only sanctioned forums for campaigning), and at 
the polls for voting and vote counting. 
Approximately two weeks prior to the elections, AAI trained UJCC monitors to 
conduct a statistical certification of results through a parallel vote tabulation (PVT). The 
UJCC conducted the PVT in thirteen of the 214 elections for the Constituent Assembly. 
Significantly, there was a 100 percent correspondent between the PVT and projected 
winners and the official winner in all thirteen elections. 
The international observer delegation reported that the Constituent Assembly 
election was not without flaws. But while there were some problems related to voter 
registration, registration certificates, the late announcement of the polling places, and the 
failure to display voter registers before the election in some areas of the country, there 
was no evidence of any systematic attempt to manipulate the outcome of this exercise. 
CHAPTER VII 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Findings 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the principal factors that influenced 
the administrators of the AREAF to focus on Kenya, Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire. The 
study set out to achieve the following objective: To examine the relationship between 
assistance provided by AREAF and democratic transitions, in the selected countries. 
First, in an examination of thirty-one countries, the type of transition each country 
was undergoing, and the type of assistance package offered, there seems to be a pattern of 
assistance package offered, there seems to be a pattern of assistance based on the 
transitional approach. The modernization transitional approach was not accounted for in 
any of the thirty-one countries, while the strategic approach only appeared once. 
However, Table 1 shows nineteen countries with civil society transition. Two countries 
received the full service package, while twelve received the intermediate package and five 
received the basic package. In the case of the institutional transition approach, there were 
one full service package, three intermediate packages and only one basic package. 
A closer look at the selected countries reveals even more details. In Kenya, where 
the transitional approach was institutional (grant compliance), the assistance package was 
basic; a pre-electoral assessment and the election monitoring process. In Uganda, where 
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the transition followed the civil society approach, AREAF rendered a full assistance 
package. In this package, all of the services were offered. Finally, in the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire, where the transitional approach was also the civil society approach, the 
assistance package received was basic. The relationship between transition type and type 
of assistance in the selected countries remains unclear. However, it does not appear that 
the type of transitional approach had an impact on AREAF funding activities in the 
selected countries. 
Conclusions 
What is apparent, however, is the significance of the role that each country plays 
in its own region (west, central and east) and how that role falls in line with U.S. foreign 
policy towards maintaining economic stability, security, and encouraging democratization 
efforts in the region. The AREAF was developed by USAID to respond quickly to the 
changes occurring in sub-Saharan Africa. The services provided by the AREAF were a 
means of effectively promoting U.S. foreign policy in the region. Both Côte d’Ivoire and 
Uganda are regarded as regional stabilizers and provide examples of good governance. 
As noted by Ntungwe Ndue, fragile democratic states need the support of other 
democratic states to survive. Because the Clinton Administration has yet to offer a 
particular framework for supporting African efforts to establish more accountable 
governance, it is of course in the best interests of the U.S. to assist the efforts of those 
successfully reforming states. It is equally as important that Kenya receive U.S. 
encouragement in terms of democratic reform and state observation of human rights. 
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Stability in Kenya is important not only because of economic interests, but also because 
the U.S. still depends on access to Kenyan ports and airfields for various military 
planning scenarios involving the deployment of U.S. forces in the Gulf as well as east 
Africa. Stability in the region leads to economic stability and greater economic 
cooperation between the countries in the regions and also facilitates trade and investment 
opportunities for foreign investors. 
President Clinton’s trip to Africa in March, 1998, was an attempt to take 
advantage of the economic as well as the democratic reforms occurring on the continent. 
“We have a growing stake in Africa’s success,”1 said Brian Atwood, administrator of 
USAID. Africa is a market of 700 million people, and thus far, trade with the continent 
already eclipses trade with the former Soviet Union by 20%. There are some 100,000 
American jobs directly tied to exports to Africa. Although trade with Africa is only one 
percent of all U.S. trade, seven percent (7%) of Africa’s imports are Ameican. There is 
clearly economic opportunity for both the U.S. and Africa here. Despite these enormous 
possibilities for both countries, these prospects would quickly diminish if there was no 
stability in the regions.2 
According to Checchi & Company Consulting, Inc., the independent consulting 
firm that was responsible for the program evaluation of AREAF, since its inception in 
1992, AREAF program activities have been performed in many countries with varying 
'Press Briefing by National Security Advisory Sandy Berger, Administrator of AID Brian 
Atwood, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater http://www.whitehouse.gov/Africa 19980320- 
5382.html 20 March 1998. 
2Ibid. 
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degrees of success. The impact of the programs is often intangible, but AREAF partners 
are convinced that through providing technical and election monitoring services, the 
organization has had a substantial influence on the development of African strategies that 
can eventually lead to democratic transition.3 However, added Checchi, although 
AREAF has contributed to free and fair elections it would be unrealistic to expect that 
AREAF projects will be able to create new democratic institutions and orientations.4 
Recommendations 
In all cases AREAF observers worked diligently with local civic and human rights 
groups, however, attempts to include a higher concentration on students, and training via 
workshops and seminars for rural areas where the need for civic and voter education is 
most needed should be attempted. Inclusion of this population would be beneficial to the 
advancement of a democratic society. This can be done through a small reduction in the 
number of international observers and travel and per diem and by the use of domestic 
observers as well as observers from neighboring democratic countries to train as well as 
monitor elections. 
3Final Report, 238-39. 
4Ibid. 
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Funds 






1 CAMFROON 11 5nt Civil Society Intenn Pres 11-Oct-92 $249.515.00 $249.515.00 NDI 19 
2 GUINEA 5 6 rn Civil Society Intenn I .eg & Pres l9-Dec-93 $5X6X19.00 $586.839.00 IRI 32 
1 111 '(H R Xm Interm Pres I & Pres2 14 Fell 93; 26-2 $4.39.235.00 $219.617.00 NDI 6 
4 T( )( !<) 2 7m C ivil Society Intenn I .eg & Pres 25-Oct-95 $420.000 00 $420.000.00 NDI 7 
5 CAR 2.7m Institutional Intenn Leg & Pres 17-Oct-95 $154.748.00 $154.748.00 NDI 2 
6 RWANDA 7.2m Basic I .eg & Pres indefinitely $125,000 00 $125.000 00 NDI,IRI 7 
7 GHANA 12.4m Institutional Full I .eg & Pres 03 Nov 92;03 $452.822.00 $225 411 00 CCEU 13 
X NAMIBIA 1 .4 in Strategic Intenn Reg & Local 30 Nov 92;03 $359.000.00 $359.000.00 NDI 10 
9 KF.NYA 24.Xm Institutional Basic I .eg & Pres 29-Dec-92 $1.044.914 00 $1 044.914.00 IRI.AAJ 54 
10 FRI FRF.A 2 in Civil Society Intenn Referendum 23-25 Apr 92 $465 470.00 $465.470.00 AAI 17 
11 DJIBOl m 5.2m Civil Society Basic I .eg & Pres 18 Dec 92; 07 $35.240 00 $17.620.00 AAI 2 
12 SENEGAL 6.8m Civil Society Intenn I -eg & Pres 17 Feb 93,09 M $559.029 00 $279.514,50 NDI 42 
1 3 MADAC.ASCA 12ni Civil Society Intenn I ,cg & Pres 93 $53X 530.00 $179.510.00 AAI 14 
14 LOSOTHO 17m Civilian Basic Pre-Asses Only 27-Mar-93 $149.756.00 $149.756.00 IRI 6 
15 TANZANIA 25m Civil Society Intenn Municipal&I .eg Oct 94,Oct 95 $109.755.00 $54.877.00 IRI 5 
16 CHAD 6.2 m Civil Society Basic I .eg & Pres Apr-95 $20.000.00 $20.000.00 AAI 2 
17 BFNIN 4.8m Civil Society Intenn Local.Nat.,Pres 1995;! 995; 1995 $690.433 00 $230.144.00 NDI 43 
IX BURUNDI 5.6m Civil Society Full I -e g & Pres Mar 94;Sep 95 $431 021 00 $215.510.00 NDI 20 
19 GUINFA BISS Im Institutional Intenn I .eg & Pres 7-.lul-94 $237.605.00 $237 605 00 IRI 12 
20 CONGO 1 Xm Civil Society Basic I .egtf 2 (repeat) 1993 $128.885 00 $42.961.00 AAI 4 
21 GABON Im Civil Society Basic I .eg & Pres 5-Dec-93 $364.666.00 $.364.666.00 AAI,NDI 19 
22 UGANDA 16m Civil Society Full Cons Assembly 2X Mar 94, June 96 $1 280.477.00 $640.223.00 AAI,NDI 19 
24 SIFRRA UFO 4 m Civilian Rule Basic Leg, Pres Reg Mar-96 $577.748.00 $192.5X2.00 A/M 8 
24 MAI 1 Xm Civil Society Intenn Assessment Feb-96 $198.534.00 $198.534.00 NDI 14 
25 CAI’F YFRDE 30X000 Intenn Technical Assist 2-Feb-96 $170.534.00 $170.534.00 /AAI 1 1 
26 COTF d'lYOIR 1.4.6m Civil Society Basic Leg 15 .\pr 95; Oct95; $1 087.306.00 $362.435.00 AAI,NDI 47 
27 MOZAMBIQU 17.4m Civil Society Intenn Pres 28-30 Oct 94 $175.892 00 $175 892.00 /AAI 12 
2X ZAMBIA 7 Xm Civil Society Intenn Political Party Mar 96; 16 Apr $576.528.00 $192.176 00 NDI 15 
29 MALAWI 8 5m Institutional Interm Referendum I4-JUH-93 $61.733.00 $61.7.33.00 NDI 1 
30 ZIMBABWE 11m Civil Society Intenn Pres I .eg Mar 94; Sep 95 $125.000.00 $62 500.00 IRI 3 
31 GAMBIA 1 2m Basic Regional Apr 95; May 95 $59.401.00 $59.401.00 NDI 2 
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